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ABSTRACT 
Can enterprise zones have any long-term effects on the economic 
status of minority populations or on the concentration of poverty in urban 
neighborhoods? This question was tackled from two perspectives. First, do 
enterprise zone interventions make sense in the context of existing models of 
racial inequality and ghetto development. Second, do the existing literature 
and evaluation studies provide evidence that enterprise zones are benefiting 
the urban poor in general and poor minorities in particular? 
This study examines five selected official evaluations of state enterprise 
zone programs looking at how incentives are targeted toward specific 
populations and places and whether benefits to targeted communities were 
measured. The goals of state enterprise zone programs definitely include 
economic advancement for the disadvantaged and reducing poverty, but 
these goals are not directly reflected by the structure of enterprise zone 
programs or program evaluations. Existing measures of benefits to targeted 
populations or areas, generally yield negative results. 
The principal finding from this review of enterprise zone evaluations 
is the weak link between the structure of the programs, what they intend to 
accomplish, and what accomplishments evaluators measure. Existing 
evaluation research on enterprise zones does not provide evidence that 
existing enterprise zone programs are decreasing racial income disparity or 
improving the conditions of the urban poor. Enterprise zones are the wrong 
tool to fix the lack of economic opportunity in blighted urban neighborhoods 
because there is a poor fit between the structure of enterprise zones and the 
goal of providing opportunities for economic advancement to the urban 
poor. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
The phenomena of concentrated urban poverty in the U.S. has a 
complex relationship with race. Urban minority populations have suffered 
disproportionately from de-industrialization and economic instability 
(Wilson 1987). Yet, the most talked about urban economic development 
program designed to create opportunity in poverty areas does not explicitly 
addresses questions of race or even disadvantage Qones 1987, Harris 1992, 
Glover 1993). Many advocates of enterprise zones hope they will help 
alleviate racial economic disparity that leaves concentrations of poor 
minority populations in depressed urban areas. This research project looks at 
how urban enterprise zones address the issue of racial inequity through their 
goals, program structure, and measured outcomes. 
Variations on the enterprise zone theme have been the centerpiece of 
the White House urban agenda under Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton 
(Bendick and Rasmussen 1986, Boyle 1995, Fulton and Newman 1994, Mier 
and Pelzer 1982). Thirty-eight states have their own enterprise zone programs 
(Rubin and College 1994; Wong 1996). Yet despite this popularity, nobody has 
demonstrated the connection between enterprise zones and the problems of 
concentrated urban poverty and inequality that they seek to address. Poor 
inner-city neighborhoods have high concentrations of minorities, enterprise 
zones target these "depressed" sections of inner cities, but enterprise zone 
programs make few explicit claims about who receives the benefits. Given 
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the presence of pronounced racial inequality, the unanswered question is 
how enterprise zones address race. To be consistent with the goals of 
community and economic advancement, enterprise zones should provide 
tangible benefits for minority members of the community. Proponents of 
enterprise zones claim they will provide new economic opportunities in an 
expanding economic pie (Green 1990). But the rhetoric of zones is not simply 
about growth, it is targeted growth that will touch the most distressed 
communities. In contrast, most reports of the benefits of enterprise zones 
give figures of jobs created, dollars invested, and numbers of new business 
starts without reference to the distribution of those benefits. The simple fact 
that businesses and jobs locate within designated enterprise zones does not 
necessarily translate into increased opportunities for racial minority residents 
of the community. A full understanding of the benefits of urban enterprise 
zones must take a critical approach and ask who receives those benefits. 
Purpose and Significance 
This project looks at how state urban enterprise zone programs and 
evaluations studies address race. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) is about to commission an evaluation of the federal 
enterprise zone program, and many states have yet to complete program 
evaluations. This research could contribute to improving program 
evaluation designs and to a better understanding of the merits of enterprise 
zone programs. A better conceptual understanding of enterprise zones 
combined with more sensitive evaluation criteria will increase the likelihood 
that these programs contribute to increased economic opportunity for 
minority residents of inner cities and to urban revitalization in general. Most 
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importantly, if there is no evidence to suggest that enterprise zones can 
contribute to economic opportunity in urban poverty areas, then it is time to 
reconsider the whole concept. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 review relevant literature on enterprise zones, 
economic theories of poverty areas, and research on the benefits of enterprise 
zones for minority populations.I I outline several causes of racially 
segregated urban poverty areas and discuss the ways enterprise zones may 
address those underlying causes. 
Chapter 5 involves close textual analysis of five state enterprise zone 
evaluation studies focusing on program goals, targeting mechanisms, and 
incentives. I selected Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin for 
their geographic diversity, program variety, inclusion of urban enterprise 
zones, and availability of an official evaluation study report. While these 
states and reports are diverse, they may not be entirely representative of all 
zone programs and evaluations. This study identifies the extent to which 
benefits to minority populations are anticipated and measured through 
written program goals, incentives, and evaluations. I examine stated goals 
and program explanations for references to (1) race, (2) disadvantage (as an 
attribute of people), and (3) distress (as an attribute of a place). This study 
identifies programmatic links to the objective of increasing economic 
opportunity for inner-city minorities present in (1) zone selection criteria, (2) 
1The scant existing literature deals primarily with blacks to the exclusion of other minority 
groups. While the evidence discussed in this paper is primarily looking at black-white income 
disparity, many of the ideas apply to other racial/ ethnic groups that are affected by 
concentrated urban poverty and income inequality. I suggest that future evaluation research on 
enterprise zones be cast more broadly to look at the program's effects on inner-city minority 
residents including Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans. 
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requirements to qualify for incentives, and (3) the types of incentives offered. 
Finally, I examine the indicators used in program evaluation studies to 
determine if they reveal any information about program participation by 
minority members of the population or benefits to them. The concluding 
chapter sums up the relationships between the idea of revitalizing poverty 
areas and enterprise zone goals, programs, and achievements. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE ENTERPRISE ZONE CONCEPT 
Government Policy and Targeted Redevelopment 
"There has been a long-standing national interest in distributing the 
nation's economic growth in a manner that reduced the number of places and 
groups that are left outside the economic mainstream" (Hanson 1983: 61). 
Policies promoting westward expansion, port development, grants to canal 
and railroad companies, regulation of interstate transportation rates, and the 
national highway system served to connect the national economy and 
disperse economic growth. The Full Employment Act, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, the Area Redevelopment Act, the Appalachian Regional 
Commission, the antipoverty program, and the Model Cities program worked 
towards achieving inter-group and inter-regional equity through economic 
opportunity. 
Enterprise zones are only the most recent example in a long history of 
targeted economic development programs. Federal programs focusing on 
minority opportunity were developed in response to the urban riots in the 
sixties. The Urban Employment Opportunities Development Act of 1967 was 
a federal program to subsidize the location of corporate branch plants in poor 
urban areas. Community development corporations were created by part of 
the Special Impact Program of the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity 
(Harrison 1974). Until the late seventies, loans were the chief component of 
minority business assistance. During the 1980s targeted procurement 
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programs became the backbone of minority business programs, with total 
dollar amounts increasing substantially. 
Despite a notable federal commitment to lessening inequality, other 
federal programs including home finance, public housing, and highway 
construction, have contributed to the spatial concentration of poverty. Since 
World War II, policies favoring decentralized suburban growth assisted the 
exodus of upper and middle-income households from central cities, leaving 
many urban neighborhoods disproportionately poor and disproportionately 
minority (Florida and Feldman 1988). Despite the relatively open borders, 
segregation persists. As workers and consumers moved out of the city, so did 
many shops, services, and jobs. Many urban areas have experienced long-
term decline or stagnation in economic activity. Ironically, civil rights 
legislation helped undermine black-owned businesses in black communities 
by opening up new markets and allowing residents to purchase goods and 
services outside the area Qones 1987). Increased residential choice for blacks 
led to selective out-migration which has left ghettos very poor albeit still 
disproportionately minority (Bates 1995). 
The Origin and Adaptation of Enterprise Zones 
The origin of enterprise zones is usually traced back to British Labour 
Party activist, Peter Hall, who proposed "freeports" in 1977 as a last-ditch 
effort to revitalize severely blighted areas. Hall hoped to allow private 
business to re-create the success of Hong Kong's economic transformation 
within the most severely blighted and abandoned areas of Liverpool and 
Glasgow (Hall 1982). These enterprise zones would have import duty and tax 
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exemption, no barriers to international trade or investment, deregulation, 
and a drastic reduction of social services. 
The Heritage Foundation brought the enterprise zone idea across the 
Atlantic in 1979 with a pamphlet calling for deregulation, free trade, and the 
elimination of the minimum wage in order to allow small start-up 
companies to thrive and create wealth (Green 1990). By lowering costs, 
enterprise zones would help the creation of new firms. Like Hall's 
"freeports," the Heritage Foundation invoked enterprise zones as an 
approach to encourage economic reuse of depressed urban areas by making 
private investment more profitable through tax and regulatory relief (Green 
1990, Hall 1981, Hall 1982). 
On U.S. soil, enterprise zones quickly evolved away from the 
international free trade zone concept toward a focus on fostering new 
entrepreneurial activity. As enterprise zones became more widely discussed 
in the U.S., the discourse began to include benefits for the urban poor who 
would participate in the economic revitalization. American adaptations of 
enterprise zones focus specifically on creating new private-sector jobs instead 
of focusing broadly on the economic prosperity of the firm. A goal of many 
enterprise zones is to increase economic opportunities for residents within 
the zone. Strong supporters of enterprise zones, like Representative Jack 
Kemp, predicted deregulation and tax breaks for distressed areas would be a 
way to create indigenous economic growth with minimal losses in public 
revenue. Kemp saw enterprise zones as "a way to uncork the entrepreneurial 
spirit that lies dormant in every downtrodden urban neighborhood" 
(Guskind 1990). Proponents claimed the zones would create new businesses 
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and new jobs without diverting people and economic activity from elsewhere 
(Green 1990). 
Support and funding for federal enterprise zones finally coalesced in 
the wake of the 1992 Los Angeles riots (Gunn 1993, Boyle 1995). Civil unrest 
created a strong national mandate to take action and became the touchstone 
in many urban policy debates. The connection drawn between urban riots in 
Los Angeles and Miami and enterprise zones reinforced the expectation that 
enterprise zones would ease the strain in poor, predominately black and 
Hispanic neighborhoods. 
Components of Enterprise Zone Programs 
It is difficult to make categorical statements about all enterprise zones 
since state, local, and federal programs are diverse and they have changed 
significantly in the last fifteen years. The original enterprise zone proposals 
in the U.S. were "federal, supply-side, anti-regulatory, conservative 
Republican" programs designed to "attract new, small businesses to the inner 
city," while by the time enterprise zones were implemented they were "state 
or local, private-public, reregulatory partnerships" with the additional goal of 
retaining existing businesses in urban, rural, and suburban areas (Wolf 1990). 
The common elements that define enterprise zones are tax and regulatory 
changes targeted to an economically distressed geographical area. As 
legislatures wrestled with program details, enterprise zones became an 
collection of favorite pieces of past programs melded with supply-side 
incentives. 
Enterprise zone eligibility criteria descend directly from Urban 
Development Action Grants (UDAG) program criteria (DED 1987, Green 
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1990). States adopted these criteria trying to second-guess federal officials 
even before a federal enterprise program materialized (Green 1990). State and 
federal criteria include measures of both physical blight and residents' 
economic well-being: high unemployment, persistent poverty, low 
household income, declining population, UDAG eligibility,s high proportion 
of population on public assistance, the minority composition of the 
population, housing vacancies, and physical deterioration (DED 1987, Glover 
1993). 
The Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Bill sponsored by Kemp and 
Garcia in 1980, included such provisions as cuts in social security, capital gains 
taxes cuts, and rapid depreciation allowances. The 1981 version eliminated 
capital gains taxes and provided additional tax credits. Other measures 
included privatizing some public services, cutting other services, prohibiting 
rent control, minimizing regulations, and weakening labor unions 
(Goldsmith 1982). 
At the other end of the spectrum, President Clinton's Enterprise 
Communities and Empowerment Zones Act is not structured as a simple 
supply-side incentive package; it is a more comprehensive reinvestment 
package targeted at designated depressed areas. It integrates the supply-side 
enterprise zone approach with a community planning and empowerment 
approach descended from Model Cities (Rubin and College 1994). This 
expanded scope draws on the lesson from early enterprise zones that tax 
su.s. Code 42-69-5318. UDAG eligibility and selection criteria include the existence of areas of 
concentrated poverty within the city in contiguous census tracts housing 10% of the population 
in which at least 70 percent of the residents have incomes below 80 percent of the median 
income of the city and at least 30 percent of residents have incomes below the national poverty 
level. Other criteria used to score applications include demonstrated results in providing low 
and moderate income housing, age of housing, extent of population lag, growth of per capita 
income, unemployment, and surplus labor. 
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breaks and regulatory relief are weak policies when not combined with other 
programs. The act includes wage credits for hiring zone residents and direct 
benefits like day care, drug-use prevention, crime control, and job training 
(Szabo and DeMott 1993). 
Enterprise zone programs at the state and local level have expanded 
from preferential tax treatment and more flexible application of regulations to 
encompass labor-related incentives, special government services, 
infrastructure investments, and preferential access to government grants 
(Gunn 1993, Rubin and College 1994). The most common labor-related 
incentive is tax credits for hiring disadvantaged persons. Twenty-nine out of 
thirty-seven states with enterprise zone legislation have tax incentives for 
selective hiring (Rubin and College 1994). Examples of special government 
services and infrastructure include crime control, public child care, job 
training, community development programs, low interest loans, zone 
marketing, supplementary social services, landscaping, and road 
improvements. Most state and local enterprise zone initiatives still include 
some combination of property tax abatements, tax credits for hiring new 
employees, sales tax reductions, and deductions for capital improvements 
(Guskind 1990 and Jones 1987). 
Summary 
Like most economic development strategies, the early enterprise zone 
idea presumed a simple model that ignores many complexities of economic 
and social reality. Increasing investment and employment cannot solve 
every facet of the urban crisis (Munt 1991). An assortment of neo-liberal 
programs have been incorporated into enterprise zones to remedy 
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community needs unaddressed by supply-side incentives. However, while 
enterprise zones are touted as an antidote to urban blight, the discourse about 
enterprise zones largely ignores factors like racial inequality, segregation, and 
discrimination. 
Enterprise zones are not all derived from a single economic theory of 
the causes of urban distress and the diversity of programs reflects this lack of 
unified theoretical foundation. What enterprise zones have in common is 
the goal of increasing local economic prosperity and employment through 
geographically targeted incentives. A targeted economic development 
program like enterprise zones is consistent with long-held public policy goals 
of extending economic opportunity to all places and groups. The following 
chapters explore the question of whether enterprise zones further these goals 
in theory or in practice. 
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CHAPTER3 
INNER CITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RACE 
Enterprise Zones and Racial Inequality 
To understand how enterprise zones work we need to ask what causes 
the concentration of poverty in ghetto areas and how enterprise zones 
interact with those forces. This chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section highlights evidence that race is a significant variable in urban 
poverty both in terms of individual earnings and ghetto residence1. The 
second section outlines the major models of economic inequality and urban 
poverty areas. The final section identifies the broad categories of economic 
development strategies for combating inequality and urban poverty and 
draws the connections between those strategies and the models that underlie 
them. The close of the chapter explains how enterprise zones fit into the 
overall framework of models and strategies. 
The theory of enterprise zones is only racially neutral on the surface 
because it does not address issues of racism, access, and participation. 
Strategies that ignore issues of race are not truly race-neutral in practice 
because of preexisting inequalities and barriers to success (Goldsmith and 
Blakely 1992). Because of the inequality of economic fortunes associated with 
race we cannot assume that enterprise zones will benefit minorities equally 
with whites simply because urban enterprise zones target distressed 
1"Ghetto" is a frequently used term without a fixed operational definition. Although race and 
poverty are correlated, ghettos are most frequently defined by the latter. Lynn (1990) and 
Jargowsky (1994) define ghetto as central city census tracts with overall poverty rates of 40 
percent or more. 
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neighborhoods. Almost all enterprise zone programs ignore minority 
populations' special circumstances. Enterprise zone programs do not 
explicitly emphasize minority employment or ownership (Glover 1993, Jones 
1987, Munt 1991). This leads to the questions of whether enterprise zones are 
well adapted to the needs of inner-city minority populations and whether 
enterprise zones can have any long-term effects on the socioeconomic status 
of minority populations. 
Existing Racial Inequality and Concentrated Urban Poverty 
Their are many dimensions to urban poverty, but from most angles 
race and ethnicity remain important characteristics. Race matters in 
unemployment rates, skill levels, occupation, wages, and geography. Poverty 
is becoming increasingly concentrated and racial inequity is growing. 
Over the last several decades poverty has become increasingly 
concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods. As ghettos expand, the incidence 
of ghetto poverty continues to vary sharply by race. In 1980, 2 percent of all 
U.S. non-Hispanic white poor people, 21 percent of all U.S. black poor people, 
and 16 percent of all U.S. Hispanic poor people lived in ghettos. During the 
eighties "ghetto poverty among blacks increased both in terms of the number 
of blacks living in ghettos and as a percentage of the black population" 
Oargowsky 1994: 288). Almost two-thirds of the ghetto poor are black, and 
most of the rest are Hispanic (Lynn 1990). Poverty is increasing most rapidly 
among African-American and American Hispanics (Mueller 1990). 
Only a small percentage of the poor remain poor for significant parts of 
their lives, but blacks are disproportionately represented among the 
persistently poor. Between 1974 and 1983, 5 percent of the population was 
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below the poverty line for at least 80% of that period. African Americans 
made up 66% of this group in long-term poverty (Mueller 1990). 
High unemployment and low skill levels are defining characteristics of 
the ghetto (Bates 1995). Unemployment rates vary significantly by race both 
within and outside the ghetto, with black unemployment rates remaining 
roughly twice as high as those of the national economy. Unskilled inner-city 
workers are much less mobile occupationally and geographically than the 
population as a whole (Hall 1982). 
Blacks are disproportionately represented among employees in 
declining industries (Wilson 1987). A national study of the effects of de-
industrialization found that industries most affected by plant closings had 
relatively high levels of black workers. Industries that suffered most from 
foreign competition from 1964 to 1975 had an average minority work force of 
11.5 percent compared to 7.4 percent in growth industries. Blacks have also 
been less well positioned to benefit from new employment in growth 
industries because the black population is disproportionately concentrated in 
slow-growth metropolitan areas (Bartik 1993). 
Among employed workers, racial economic disparities are evident. 
Maume (1996) found that the wage gap between white and black workers has 
widened from $2.48 per hour in 1976 to $2.66 in 1985 in constant dollars. 
After controlling for education, training, and experience Maume estimates 
that 26% of the wage gap in 1985 was racial discrimination, up from 16% in 
1976. Harrison and Gorham (1992) reached similar conclusions about the 
deterioration of black earning power relative to whites at all levels of 
educational achievement. 
Minorities are extremely underrepresented in managerial employment 
and entrepreneurship even within ghetto areas (Glover 1993, Goldsmith and 
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Blakely 1992). The majority of ghetto firms are owned by white people living 
outside the ghetto (Bates 1993). Black-owned businesses employ fewer people 
and make smaller profits than white-owned firms within the ghetto. 
Economic Theories of Poverty Areas 
Poli ti cal and academic interest in ghetto economic development 
swelled in the wake of urban riots in the sixties. Policy specialists began to 
recognize the importance of economic opportunity within poor minority 
neighborhoods in addition to the more traditional goal of racial integration 
(Harrison 1974). Promoting economic opportunity became part of the 
discussion on promoting social stability (Hanson 1983). 
The relationship between race and income has been carefully 
documented in inner-city neighborhoods. Researchers looked for 
explanations for the growing poverty of inner-city neighborhoods and for the 
persistent inequity along racial lines. Racial economic inequality is 
undeniably an enduring characteristic of the economic structure of the United 
States, although academicians and politicians disagree about the forces that 
perpetuate inequality. The following is a summary of the basic explanations 
for the economics of poor inner-city minority neighborhoods. 
Neo-Classical Economic Theory 
There are two conventional approaches to racial discrimination and 
economic disparities along racial lines: utility theory and human capital 
theory. The utility theory approach stems from work done in the 1950s by 
Gary S. Becker (1971). Those who discriminate find non-monetary 
satisfaction in not employing or working with minority workers. 
"Individuals are assumed to act as if they have 'tastes for discrimination,' and 
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these tastes are the most important immediate cause of actual 
discrimination," (Becker 1971: 122). Becker used census data from 1890-1940 
and a straight forward neoclassical free market model to calculate the 
"discrimination coefficient'' which facilitated empirical comparisons of 
discrimination between places, occupations, and through time. 
The human capital approach looks to education, skills, and health to 
explain productivity differences reflected in wage differences. Minorities are 
less productive and consequently lower paid because of differences in the 
education they have been able to attain. The "flawed character" model is a 
version of the human capital approach that focuses on behavioral 
inadequacies of the poor often associated with attitudes or culture. The 
culture of poverty and racial inferiority theories are the two most common 
examples of the flawed-character perspective (Schiller 1988). The human 
capital model denies the role of discrimination and instead attributes 
inequality to impersonal economic forces (Fusfeld and Bates 1984). 
Several advocates of the human capital explanation argue that inter-
group inequality in the post civil rights era does not result from 
discrimination. Shulman and Darity (1989) call this the declining 
discrimination hypothesis. Studies supporting the declining discrimination 
hypothesis compare employed blacks and whites of the same age, education, 
or other characteristics to show declining earnings differences. The 
theoretical arguments accompanying this sort of analysis assert that efficient 
labor markets work impartially with regard to race. The implication is that 
the persistence of inequality results from cultural and human capital 
deficiencies in the minority population. Shulman and Darity present 
convincing arguments that the declining discrimination hypothesis is 
inconsistent with economic data if labor force participation and 
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underemployment are considered. Examination of labor market experiences 
during the eighties revealed increasing real wage differences between blacks 
and whites (Maume 1996). 
Utility and human capital approaches explain the persistent poverty of 
predominately minority ghetto areas without reference to market failure or 
structural processes that create inequality. The market will work to increase 
racial equality because discrimination is inefficient. Both neoclassical 
approaches to racial differences in income suggest that the solution requires 
changing people, either through changing the attitudes of those who 
discriminate or through increasing the human capital of poor individuals as 
a way of increasing productivity. 
Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis 
Kain (1968) argued that a "spatial mismatch" between new suburban 
employment locations and exclusionary housing practices reduced job 
opportunities for blacks living in the inner city. Kain explained that 
employers located in the suburbs were reluctant to risk offending white 
residents by bringing black workers into the area, resulting in little demand 
for black workers. This resembles Becker's argument except the white 
suburban consumers, rather than the employers, discriminate. On the supply 
side, distance from suburban jobs meant blacks were less likely to hear about 
job opportunities and would have to spend more time and money to 
commute when they did find employment. New jobs may be so poorly paid 
that they do not justify relocating, or they may be in areas without affordable 
housing options. More recent supporters of the mismatch hypothesis include 
Leonard (1987), Wilson (1987), Kasarda (1989), and Holzer and Ihlanfeldt 
(1996). 
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Empirical support for the spatial mismatch hypothesis comes from 
studies on residential segregation and journeys to work. In a study of 
residential and employment patterns in Chicago and Los Angeles, Leonard 
(1987: 323) concludes that "residential segregation strongly influences black 
employment patterns and limits the efficacy of efforts to integrate the 
workplace." 
The magnitude of race-specific earnings differentials resulting from the 
spatial mismatch has grown over time (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt 1996). Holzer 
and Ihlanfeldt have found through their research on 3000 employers in four 
metropolitan areas that employers located closer to black residences and 
public transportation are more likely to hire black employees, and that black 
earnings increase with the distance of their employer from black population 
centers. Their research also validates the strong effect of the skill mismatch 
which suggests that human capital investment is a policy response of equal 
importance to residential desegregation and transportation. 
Bartik' s work (1993) on economic development and black economic 
success supports the spatial mismatch hypothesis with a new twist. Bartik 
found that black earnings are highly responsive to demand in the 
metropolitan labor market, but that blacks tend to live in slow growth 
metropolitan areas. Residential location of blacks is an important 
determinate of earnings both within and between metropolitan areas. The 
implication of much of the work relating to the spatial mismatch hypothesis 
is that local labor market conditions have strong effects on the earnings of 
black central city residents. Increases in the demand for labor have positive 
effects on black household earnings despite confounding factors emphasized 
by the human capital model. 
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While Kain focused on employment discrimination as the 
predominate demand side factor preventing labor from finding employment, 
more recent advocates of the spatial mismatch hypothesis have shifted 
attention to job skill requirements as the predominate demand-side factor 
aggravating the effects of residential segregation. The spatial restructuring of 
metropolitan America has resulted in a skill mismatch as well as a spatial 
mismatch between residential patterns and employment (Galster and Keeney 
1988). The numbers of blue-collar jobs in central cities have declined since 
the sixties, partly due to a shift of production away from the central city and 
partly due to increased efficiency and expanded foreign production. A 
significant number of jobs remain in central business districts, but many 
require specific sets of qualifications and skills which make them less 
accessible to poor inner city residents. 
The research on the decline of entry-level jobs in the inner city 
provides more direct evidence that these demographic and 
employment trends have produced a serious mismatch between 
the skills of inner-city blacks and the opportunities available to 
them. Substantial job losses have occurred in the very 
industries in which urban minorities have the greatest access, 
and substantial employment gains have occurred in the higher-
education-requisite industries that are beyond the reach of most 
minority workers. (Wilson 1987: 109) 
The interaction between the spatial mismatch and the growing skill 
mismatch is a bridge between the human capital and spatial models for 
uneven development. The recognition of this interrelationship is a prelude 
to the circular causation model discussed below. 
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Structural Explanations 
In contrast to neoclassical theory in which the invisible hand of the 
market works to discourage racial discrimination and lessen inequalities, 
structural explanations assert that ghetto poverty is an artifact of the larger 
economic system. The ghetto is viewed as a separate economy peripheral to 
the economic mainstream. Researchers explain the creation and 
perpetuation of ghetto poverty through social and economic processes that 
create social and market dualism. This type of explanation looks at historical 
context and inter-group power relationships (Mueller 1990). Individual acts 
of discrimination may be harmful, but it is the economic system that ensures 
that large numbers of minorities will work for low wages and live in 
deteriorating areas. The most extreme voices for this school argue that the 
creation of the underclass and areas of physical blight are an inevitable 
outcome of capitalist economic development. 
In the basic segmented labor market framework, workers find it 
socially, psychologically, and technically difficult to move from one sector of 
the economy to another. Race, sex, and class discrimination help maintain 
this dualism. Jobs in the primary labor market pay relatively good wages and 
employers value worker skill and longevity (Gordon 1972). Jobs in the 
secondary labor market are characterized as low wage, menial jobs, with poor 
conditions and no path for career advancement. Employers in the secondary 
labor market do not place a high value on longevity or skill, and they do not 
invest significantly in worker training. Ghetto residents are mostly confined 
to the secondary labor market and often move between low-wage work, 
informal economic activities, public assistance, and government job training 
programs (Harrison 1974). This framework is articulated through the internal 
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colonialism model, the less-developed-nations model, and the circular 
causation model which differ from each other in details and in emphasis. 
The Colony Analogy 
The relationship between ghettos and the national economy bares 
some similarity to internal colonialism: the ghetto is described as a 'less 
developed country' with a severe 'balance of payments' deficit and with 
'foreign' control of the most important local political and economic 
institutions" (Harrison 1974). The legal relationship of the ghetto to the 
larger economy does not resemble colonialism, but Blauner (1969) argues that 
the process of interaction is similar. The four common elements of the 
process are (1) involuntary entry, (2) policies imposing mainstream values at 
the expense of indigenous ways of life, (3) institutionalization of colonial rule 
through local government, (4) the oppressed group is "seen as inferior or 
different in terms of alleged biological characteristics" and "exploited, 
controlled, and oppressed socially and psychically by a superiorordinate 
group" (Blauner 1969 quoted by Harrison 1974). Outsiders control many 
important ghetto institutions, like schools and police, contributing to the 
sense that the ghetto is an occupied territory. 
The Less-Developed Nation Analogy 
Concepts from the study of less-developed nations in the world 
economy have been applied to understanding American urban ghettos. 
Structural dualism between the core and periphery can apply equally to both. 
The ghetto serves as a vast reservoir of unemployed and under-employed 
labor that is constantly replenished by migration and population growth. The 
pool of unemployed workers keeps wage levels low which contributes to the 
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economy by keeping costs low. Economic growth in the advanced sector does 
not place strong upward pressure on wages in the periphery because the core 
has a tendency to use relatively capital-intensive technology in spite of the 
abundant supply of cheap labor. Actions in the public sector also contribute to 
economic dualism by failing to provide adequate transportation, education, 
and health facilities in the peripheral sector. The ghetto and mainstream 
markets are not integrated sufficiently to allocate investment by relative rates 
of return within and between the sectors (Harrison 1974). 
The primary source of income in the ghetto is from low-wage 
employment. Unskilled labor is the community's major export. Consumer 
and capital goods are imported. Purchases are financed out of labor earnings 
and transfer payments. Most income is earned outside the ghetto (Harrison 
1974). Money flows out of the ghetto go to absentee landlords and purchases 
of goods and services. Several studies document the "balance or trade" deficit 
in which minority ghetto neighborhoods pay substantially more in taxes than 
is returned in public expenditures in the area (Schaffer 1973, Harrison 1974). 
Outward flows of income, capital, and human resources to the 
rest of the economy serve to keep the ghetto in a permanently 
underdeveloped state and feed the economic interests outside 
the ghetto that have developed around those income flows, ... 
The entire economy outside of the ghetto benefits from the 
income, capital, and manpower resources that are drawn out, 
just as it benefits from a pool of low-wage labor that provides 
relatively low-cost services to those outside (Fusfeld and Bates 
1984:145) 
The less developed nation analogy suggests that like less developed 
nations, ghetto economic development cannot be achieved through 
monetary transfers: the connections between the depressed economy and the 
mainstream economy need to be strengthened. The net outward drain of 
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resources must stop to allow sufficient investment in physical and human 
resources. 
Circular Causation 
The circular causation explanation is the most complex and complete 
attempt to understand the processes of ghetto formation. It combines human 
capital, spatial mismatch, discrimination, structural, and resource drain 
explanations. More significantly, circular causation recognizes the self-re-
enforcing nature of underinvestment, disadvantage, and underachievement, 
that complicates the path to advancement. Gunnar Myrdal (1964) first 
introduced the term "cumulative causation" in The American Dilemma to 
point out the negative feedback loops that make it impossible to disentangle 
cause from effect in understanding the poverty of the underclass. 
Fusfeld and Bates (1984) look at institutionalized economic processes to 
explain the perpetuation of ghettos. Businesses in inner-city minority 
communities lack of one or more of the essential elements of a healthy 
business: (1) talented entrepreneurs, (2) access to information, (3) access to 
financial capital, and (4) access to product markets. Neither black-owned 
businesses nor other businesses have flourished in inner-city minority 
communities. Successful ghetto firms tend to be smaller, use less labor and 
are more likely to be headed by drop-outs than by college educated 
entrepreneurs. 
There is movement into and out of the ghetto. Fusfeld and Bates 
identify three barriers to upward mobility that restrain movement out of the 
ghetto: (1) race or ethnicity, (2) work and cultural patterns fostered in the 
ghetto that do not allow many people to fit easily into mainstream society, 
and (3) attitudes of people outside the ghetto which result in poor services in 
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the ghetto and minimal acceptance of ghetto residents. These barriers are 
played out in housing and job discrimination. 
The ghetto economy perpetuates its own poverty because low incomes 
mean a low standard of living in terms of food, housing, health, sanitation, 
and education. High levels of crime are both a result and a contributing cause 
to poor economic opportunities in poverty areas. These conditions reproduce 
low labor productivity and perpetuate low incomes. "The drain of resources 
out of urban poverty areas--manpower, capital, income--serves to reinforce 
the poverty" (Fusfeld and Bates 1984: 151). Cumulatively these resource flows 
create a self-sustaining system. 
Economic growth is particularly difficult for the ghetto economy. 
Its weak infrastructure, lack of local initiative and 
entrepreneurship, and the shortage of capital make it difficult to 
generate a growth process. They create instead a self-generating 
poverty cycle. More important, the tendency for resources and 
income to drain out of the ghetto economy means that even if 
the forces of development were to appear, much of their 
strength would be dissipated before they had a significant impact 
on the ghetto itself. Any program or programs that seek to 
improve the economy of urban poverty areas must reverse the 
drain of skilled manpower, capital, and income if a cumulative 
process of growth is to be established. (Fusfeld and Bates 1984: 
152) 
The process of circular causation with cumulative effects tends to 
preserve the ghetto in a relatively stable position from one generation to the 
next, even though population size and income levels may change. Programs 
that provide improved services to individuals, like education, training, 
housing, and health services, address the symptoms, not the causes of urban 
ghettos. If they are large enough and sustained long enough, such programs 
can make a contribution, but helping individuals will not increase prosperity 
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in the ghetto as long as the social and economic processes that create the 
ghetto remain in place (Fusfeld and Bates 1984). 
The fundamental processes that create and perpetuate the ghetto 
include a constant drain in human and capital resources combined with 
informal barriers that inhibit movement out of the ghetto for many people. 
Fusfeld and Bates (1984) state that the ghetto becomes home to people 
excluded from other social subsystems for a combination of the following five 
reasons: (1) race, (2) recent arrival, (3) cultural differences, (4) low earning 
power from lack of skills, poor health, etc., and (5) low income. The 
"underclass" can be distinguished from low income individuals in general by 
its isolation from mainstream values, behaviors, and the labor market 
(Ricketts 1992). 
There are no physical barriers between the ghetto and the rest of 
society, and no formal methods by which individuals are 
'committed' to life in the ghetto. The barriers are economic and 
social rather than physical, and the selection process is informal. 
(Fusfeld and Bates 1984: 149) 
Professional people who provide personal and business services leave, 
as do other talented people who can earn more money outside the ghetto. 
The lack of political power in federal, state, and sometimes local public 
finance decisions lead to inadequate local control and public investment. 
Capital resources leave through the allocation of public resources, the 
investment practices of banks, and through deferred maintenance on real 
property. 
The circular causation explanation includes the notion of structural 
discrimination. In contrast to the conventional economic view that the 
market will weed out discrimination in the absence of what Becker (1971) 
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calls a "taste for discrimination," discrimination is part of the structure of the 
economy. By gaining convenience and low wages, employers may maximize 
profits while contributing to racial inequality. Prejudice and institutional 
employment practices work together to make race a barrier to economic 
advancement. Much discrimination in the market is unintentional and 
hidden beneath traditional modes of operation (Schiller 1988). 
Discrimination and inequality in the educational system compounds 
discrimination in the labor market to the disadvantage of minority workers. 
Some employers willfully exclude racial minorities, others "rely on 
recruitment procedures that have the same effect on minority racial groups" 
(Schiller 1988: 162). Relying heavily on existing employees for recruits works 
against would-be minority applicants who do not have a network of contacts 
already in better employment positions. Low-income minorities are seldom 
aware of unadvertised employment opportunities and are rarely brought to 
the attention of recruitment personnel (Schiller 1988: 154) Traditional 
recruitment agencies and advertising forums are more accessible to current 
members of the economic mainstream. Minority employees hesitate to apply 
for jobs where they risk embarrassment or harassment. 
Breaking the cyclical processes of ghetto formation requires 
intervention in job market discrimination and reversing the drain of skilled 
personnel, capital, and income. Policy interventions to relocate residents or 
job opportunities to a closer geographic proximity would have minimal 
impact since they do not deal with the human factors contributing to 
pervasive poverty (Galster 1992). The ghetto experience becomes internalized 
in the values and behaviors of members of the underclass, complicating the 
transition to the mainstream economy. 
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Economic Development Strategies for Poverty Areas 
The multidimensional problems of poverty areas call for a 
comprehensive strategy. Economic development programs to counter ghetto 
poverty and racial inequality typically involve one or more of the following. 
Minority Entrepreneurial Strategy 
The minority entrepreneurial model focuses on conventional capitalist 
institutions like private ownership and profit maximization. Some public 
sector programs focus on improving the profitability and viability of black-
owned businesses. Such support is justified by past inequities. The Small 
Business Administration, (SBA) and Office of Economic Opportunity 
provided low-interest loans for small minority-owned businesses. Minority 
business set aside programs for public procurement and technical assistance 
also hold potential in business development (Harrison 1974). 
Community Economic Development 
Community economic development focuses on collective action, 
ownership of property by community residents, and institution building 
(Harrison 1974). Leaders urge residents to spend money within the 
community to stem the outward flow of wealth. Community development 
corporations work to improve the entire community by channeling capital, 
technical skills, and various kinds of assistance into target inner-city 
neighborhoods (Fusfeld and Bates 1984). These efforts focus on consciousness 
raising and reducing the outward flow of resources from the area. 
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Equal Opportunity 
The equal opportunity approach focuses on breaking down the barriers 
that hold talented poor people from climbing the economic ladder. 
Affirmative action, minority scholarships, anti-discrimination laws, and 
minority set-asides in government procurement are the most common 
examples. Encouraging and assisting individuals in their career growth sets 
an example that people can work their way out of the ghetto. Monitoring of 
discriminatory employment practices also keeps pressure on firms to provide 
equal opportunities. Multicultural education efforts attempt to change 
attitudes and behaviors that lie at the heart of intergroup alienation and 
discrimination. 
Human Capital Investment 
Investment in human capital seeks to improve the earning power of 
the poor through increased productivity. Individuals need education, health, 
and marketable skills to succeed in the economic mainstream (Hanson 1983). 
Federal and state funding of human capital development in low revenue 
jurisdictions is necessary to provide quality services in poor areas. 
Locational Intervention 
In the spatial mismatch hypothesis the economic troubles of the ghetto 
are primarily spatial. Getting outside firms to locate in the ghetto bringing 
jobs with them or relocating families to affordable housing in the suburbs can 
counter the concentration of the urban jobless in poverty areas. Policies 
include enhanced public transit access to suburban work sites and 
inclusionary zoning to promote dispersed low income housing around the 
metropolitan area. 
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Job Creation 
The government can work toward full employment by creating public 
service employment for the urban jobless or through macroeconomic policies 
promoting job growth (Wilson 1987). The key is increasing the availability of 
employment at living wages. 
Connections Between Theory and Practice 
The following chapter documents that state enterprise zones combine 
community economic development, human capital investment, locational 
intervention, and job creation economic development strategies (See Table 3-
1 for a summary of the relationships between strategies and models). There 
are few examples of integration of the minority entrepreneurial or economic 
opportunity approaches to reversing economic distress. The twin emphases 
of the enterprise zone strategy for job creation are combating the spatial 
mismatch and creating jobs through reducing the costs of doing business. 
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Table 3-1. Correspondence Between Theories and Policies 
Policy 
Minority 
Entrepreneurial 
Development 
Community Economic 
Development 
Equal Opportunity 
Human Capital 
Investment 
Locational Intervention 
Job Creation 
Tax breaks to lower the 
costs of doing business* 
Key 
Utility 
Theory 
+++ 
Human 
Capital 
+ 
+ 
+++ 
+++ 
+ 
Model 
Spatial 
Mismatch 
+++ 
+ 
no apparent connection between the policy and the theory 
Structural -
Circular 
Causation 
++ 
+++ 
++ 
++ 
+ 
+ there is a weak connection between the policy and some element of the 
theory 
++ the policy deals directly with at least one of the elements of the theory 
+++ the policy addresses the primary element of the theory 
*this policy was not discussed in this chapter, but is included in the table 
because of its primary importance in enterprise zone programs. If zones were 
effective at creating jobs within zones they would be combating the spatial 
mismatch by bringing jobs closer to poor populations. 
This review of enterprise zones and of theories of ghetto economic 
development suggest that a successful enterprise zone must (1) attenuate the 
drain of human and financial capital, (2) counter labor market 
discrimination, (3) provide adequate levels of public investment in human 
capital, and (4) facilitate the integration of ghetto and mainstream economies. 
In addition, if small business owners are to benefit from the program as 
entrepreneurs, their needs for financial capital, access to product markets, and 
technical assistance must be overcome. Increased economic growth at the 
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state level may trickle down into areas of concentrated poverty, but without 
intervention, the forces of economic dualism will maintain pockets of 
concentrated poverty even amid prosperity. 
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CHAPTER4 
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON ENTERPRISE ZONES AND RACE 
Benefits of Enterprise Zones for Inner City Minorities 
As a prelude to Chapter Five, which looks at official evaluation studies 
of state enterprise zone programs, this chapter reviews the existing literature 
on the benefits of enterprise zones for members of minority communities as 
workers and entrepreneurs. There is no substantial body of research on this 
topic, but a handful of writers have published their preliminary findings and 
raised some important questions, criticisms and hypotheses. 
The most patent oversight in existing evaluations of enterprise zones 
is the general inattention to the demographic characteristics of the 
individuals and areas that benefit. All but one or two studies ignore the race 
issue entirely. For this reason the empirical evidence presented in this 
chapter is patchy and inconclusive. The second half of this chapter outlines a 
number of criticisms of enterprise zones relating to their potential to benefit 
minorities: failure to effectively target needy minority populations, lack of 
support for small start-ups with limited capital and expertise, failure to assure 
adequate levels of investment in infrastructure and human capital 
development, and inattention to diverse needs. There is growing evidence 
that tax incentives by themselves are not the right tool to reverse the cycle of 
decay in distressed urban areas or to combat the racial segregation and 
inequality that characterize such neighborhoods. However, even enterprise 
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zone critics maintain optimism that more comprehensive enterprise zone 
programs may be able to show tangible results. 
Minority participation in zone employment 
By 1993, thirty-seven states had enterprise zone legislation and 25 
reported job creation resulting from their programs (Rubin and College 1994). 
Wilder and Rubin (1996) document substantial variation in the proportion of 
new jobs going to ]ow and moderate income persons and the numbers going 
to zone residents. New or retained jobs held by low or moderate income 
persons range from 13 percent in Michigan City, Indiana to 90 percent in 
Thief River Falls, Minnesota. The range was wider for jobs held by zone 
residents: 2 to 90 percent. On average, 20 to 30 percent of new jobs went to 
zone residents. The sample based evaluation of the California zone program 
suggests that the California zone program is successfully reaching the target 
population; of the 1,800 new jobs 1,151 went to economically disadvantaged 
persons. 
Glover provides the first empirical evidence of the effects of enterprise 
zones on minority employment (Harris 1992). She surveyed zone 
administrators in 24 different states and received 101 responses. Based on this 
sample Glover found that minorities are actually over-represented in 
enterprise-zone jobs: 38 percent of the employees in the zones are minorities 
compared to 26 percent of zone residents (Glover 1993). This study still leaves 
several questions unanswered. For instance, we do not know what type of 
employment minorities find or what conditions lead to higher levels of 
minority employment. 
Beyond the question of who benefits from zones, there is doubt about 
their true job creation impact. Some enterprise zones have not created job 
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growth at all. Most studies measure jobs created or retained on an absolute 
basis, instead of measuring net job growth. Of the studies that also measured 
job loss, many have found it to be significant (Wilder and Rubin 1996). In fact 
some experienced net job losses. Both the success stories and the low 
performers need to be interpreted with caution because they are not 
controlled to separate job change attributable to the zone from the underlying 
economic trends. Dowall, Beyler, and Wong (1994) were forced to conclude 
that zone initiatives in California "were not conclusively associated with any 
of the estimated positive outcomes (Wilder and Rubin 1996). The U.S. 
General Accounting Office (1989) study of Maryland zones found no clear 
causal link between job growth and zone designation or incentives. On a 
more positive side, Rubin and Wilder (1989) used shift-share analysis and 
found positive job growth attributable to the Evansville Zone in Indiana. 
Many evaluations use methods that ignore the issue entirely. 
Despite HUD' s consistently positive evaluations of enterprise zones, 
the Congressional Black Caucus disputes the zones' effectiveness (Harris 
1992). The Board of Economists assembled by Black Enterprise magazine for a 
symposium on enterprise zones gave them a less than favorable review. The 
Board concluded that enterprise zones' ten-year history demonstrates an 
emphasis on traditional economic development and public relations without 
any serious effort to target minority workers. No comprehensive research 
shows enterprise zones to be ineffective at improving economic conditions 
for minorities, yet evidence from case studies illustrates some of the ways 
programs can fail. 
Irons (1994) reports that enterprise zones frequently fail to serve the 
targeted community. A 175 acre enterprise zone was created contiguous to a 
low-income housing project with predominantly black residents. The zone's 
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stated objective was to provide opportunities for the housing project's 
residents. Irons laments: 
Our objective was to get the businesses in the enterprise zone to 
hire the people in the housing project. But there were all kinds 
of excuses: 'We couldn't train them. We couldn't find them. 
We couldn't keep them, just one excuse after another. It was 
hard to refute some of this ... but we felt we were being 
circumvented. (cited in McCoy 1993) 
The enterprise zone administrators did not have tools to identify and avoid 
racially discriminatory hiring practices by zone firms or to train targeted 
residents to meet employer needs. 
A 1983 evaluation of the enterprise zone program in Maryland touted 
the creation of 1,755 new jobs during a period when enterprise zone firms 
claimed corporate income tax credits for employing only 49 economically 
disadvantaged persons statewide Gones 1987). A study of New Jersey's 
enterprise zones found that 40 percent of zone businesses were unable to hire 
zone residents for 25 percent of their new positions as required to qualify for 
zone benefits. Firms explained this by claiming they could not operate 
profitably if they hired zone residents for 25 percent of their positions 
(Levitan and Miller 1992). Firms cited the need for better trained workers as a 
key reason they did not hire more zone residents. These negative examples 
suggest some of the barriers that may undermine the potential benefits of 
enterprise zones for minority communities. 
Enterprise zones do not have magical qualities that can 
overcome all physical, social, and economic barriers to 
revitalization. In this respect, zone critics are correct in arguing 
that the myriad social and physical problems plaguing many 
urban neighborhoods (e.g. decaying infrastructure, high crime 
rates, inadequate school systems) are not responsive to targeted 
development incentives. (Wilder and Rubin 1996) 
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The one unexpected finding about enterprise zones and minority 
communities comes from regression analysis performed by Erickson, 
Friedman, and McCluskey (1989) in a cross sectional-study aimed at 
understanding the conditions associated with successful enterprise zones 
(Wilder and Rubin 1996). The percentage of minorities in the zone 
population was one of only a few variables positively correlated with 
investment and employment growth. There is no obvious causal relation, 
but at the very least this indicates that many of the more successful zones are 
located in areas with higher minority population. 
Type of enterprise zone employment for minorities 
Few studies of enterprise zones have documented the skill levels, 
wages, or duration of the jobs created (Wilder and Rubin 1996). One valid 
concern is that a policy that provides minimum wage jobs to minority 
workers will not significantly improve the long-term opportunities and 
economic prosperity of minority families. Any meaningful job program for 
disadvantaged minority populations must have a long-term goal of helping 
minorities into career-path jobs that pay more than minimum wage. 
Within enterprise zones, minority-owned firms and minority 
employees tend to be most highly concentrated in low-wage services (Glover 
1993). Twelve percent of new jobs in the 101 enterprise zones surveyed by 
Glover were minimum wage jobs, compared to 7.9 percent of jobs in the 
national economy. Seventy-eight percent of zone administrators reported 
that at least some of the new jobs in their zones paid minimum wage. These 
figures are unsurprising since enterprise zones are targeted toward firms that 
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are particularly sensitive to factor costs and because much of the available 
labor in enterprise zones is low-skilled. 
Minority entrepreneurs participation in zone programs 
Only two researchers have looked at participation in zone programs by 
minority entrepreneurs. In Glover's survey only 5.3% of firms within zones 
were minority-owned, making minority firm ownership levels within 
enterprise zones similar to comparable economic areas without enterprise 
zone designation. Many minority owners in the survey did not participate in 
the enterprise zone program (Glover 1993). While the sample of minority 
firms is quite small, it appears that the pattern of minority firm participation 
in the zones differs from non-minority participation. Jones (1987) also found 
low levels of participation by minority-owned businesses in his case study. Of 
the sixty black-owned businesses in Decatur, Illinois, ten are in the zone and 
only one participates in any way in the zone program. While the numbers 
are too small to draw firm conclusions, these studies raise strong doubts about 
whether enterprise zones assist minority-owned firms. Levels of 
participation of minority-owned firms should be included in future 
evaluation studies to provide more useful data. 
Glover's survey provides one clue to understanding low minority 
owner participation. Glover (1993) found that minority-owned firms in 
enterprise zones are concentrated in personal and business services. Overall, 
personal and business services tend to be underrepresented in the enterprise 
zones Glover surveyed. Older zones, with older firms have larger 
manufacturing firms and a more diversified mix of smaller firms supporting 
greater numbers of small service firms, like food services, that serve the 
employee and business markets. These service firms are "likely to be 
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relatively small, have a higher probability of minority ownership, and a 
higher percentage of minority employment" (Glover 1993:87). Because 
minorities own more service firms and start-up barriers are lower, 
encouraging economic diversification within the zones may lead to higher 
minority business ownership and employment. 
The Participation Gap: Barriers and Flaws 
Targeting disadvantaged and minority populations 
Although job creation and economic recovery are explicit goals of 
enterprise zone programs, zones do not explicitly address the underlying 
problem of low rates of minority business ownership and employment 
(Glover 1993). For the most part, enterprise zones fail to acknowledge the 
specificity of race; they marginalize minority concerns instead of strategically 
incorporating them into program goals. 
Jones (1987) surveyed local black business people as part of his case 
study to learn about some of the reasons for non-participation. Local black 
business people gave three reasons for low program participation Oones 1987: 
4): 
1. Unfamiliarity with the program operation and types of 
incentives offered. 
2. The program's complexity, possibly requiring the advice of tax 
consultants. 
3. The program seemed to benefit large firms, not small black-
owned firms that needing access to venture capital and technical 
assistance in starting small businesses. 
Black entrepreneurs have historically been excluded from economic 
development initiatives, and in the absences of efforts to specifically reach out 
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to them and to help them overcome barriers to participation, minority 
business people may exclude themselves through non-participation. The 
failure to assess the needs of minority entrepreneurs and to market the 
program to minority entrepreneurs are two of the program's shortcomings. 
Start-up barriers 
Enterprise zones are supposedly the key to generating new small 
businesses in the inner-city. Peter Hall argued that the abundance of 
regulations surrounding opening and running a business inhibits inner-city 
residents from exercising their entrepreneurial spirit (Hall 1982). The pure 
supply-side enterprise zone concept does not address the barriers inner-city 
entrepreneurs face in securing start-up capital. Without capital, minority-
owned firms will not be able to take advantage of the other incentives offered 
in enterprise zones. 
Some enterprise zone incentives benefit certain types of firms. Tax 
relief provides minimal incentive for start-up businesses since such 
businesses rarely have much income to pay taxes on in the first years, but tax 
relief can be a monumental benefit to larger firms with professional 
accountants (Hall 1982, Harrison 1982). Enterprise zones could even hurt 
minority enterprises by bringing in outside firms that compete with existing 
firms for the local market. Thus the type of incentives included in 
prototypical enterprise zones are prejudicial in practice against minority 
entrepreneurs and start-up firms in general. 
Public goods and services 
Many critics of the enterprise zone approach claim that supply-side 
incentives cannot jump start depressed geographic areas without direct public 
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investment in social and physical infrastructure (Gunn 1993, Levitan and 
Miller 1992). Successful enterprise zone programs therefore must include 
direct public expenditures to attract and complement private investment. 
However, in some places the withdrawal of public investment is so severe 
that it outweighs incentives provided by enterprise zone programs. A 1988 
study of the Anacostia Community enterprise zone in southwestern 
Washington indicated that problems of high crime, high insurance, and 
banks' reluctance to lend inhibited any new businesses from locating in the 
zone communities (Glover 1993). As Harrison (1982) notes: 
The rapid deterioration of these public goods in the older cities --
and their unfinished status in the new cities of the sunbelt -- has 
become a serious bottleneck to further private investment in 
these areas. In short the fiscal crisis of the state directly 
contradicts the developmental objectives of the whole enterprise 
zone concept. (Harrison 1982: 425). 
Large-scale changes are necessary to overcome the barriers in severely 
depressed urban areas. Enterprise zones do not change the fiscal inequalities 
of the current tax system that virtually ensure that some areas will be unable 
to provide adequate services and infrastructure. Some enterprise zones give 
preference to zones for state and federal grant money to provide a temporary 
infusion of outside money. As long as important public services and 
infrastructure are funded from local taxes, there is little hope to overcome the 
geographic inequalities of income and quality of life. 
Lack of jobs is only one factor in the complex cycle of poverty. 
Investment in affordable housing, education, job training, and crime 
prevention benefit low-income minority populations (Glover 1993). Even 
relatively unskilled jobs require some basic skills and basic stability. To 
40 
address these deficits, some state zone programs combine more 
comprehensive social programs with other incentives. Investment in both 
people and places are important foundations for economic growth. Elling 
and Sheldon (1991) found that state economic development policies were a 
key variable in zone success. They found the most successful zones 
complemented tax incentives with other kinds of support (Wilder and Rubin 
1996). 
Community involvement 
Gunn (1993) concluded that state enterprise zone programs, like the 
ones in New Jersey and Indiana, that emphasize neighborhood or 
community involvement in solving long-range problems are more 
successful than those, like Connecticut's, that only emphasize tax incentives. 
"The economic, material, social, and political linkages that make a small area 
into a neighborhood or community are not addressed by enterprise zones. 
Yet these linkages are the are critical determinants of the vitality of the 
community investment process" (Clarke 1982). Jones discovered some 
deficiencies in enterprise zones that limit the effectiveness of the program for 
the black community: 
For black communities in areas such as Decatur, enterprise zone 
programs may have only a minimal effect on neighborhood 
revitalization and business growth and development. However, 
with provisions for public participation of all sectors of the 
community in program design, implementation and evaluation; 
management assistance for potential entrepreneurs, marketing 
the program to black businesses and residents, and investment 
pools for development financing, enterprise zones may become 
more product than promise. Gones 1987: 6) 
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In sum, the incomplete information about the benefits of enterprise zones for 
minority populations tells a mixed story suggesting substantial variation 
between zones. There is little evidence to show that "pure" enterprise zones 
that rely on tax and regulatory breaks are effective, but researchers like Jones 
and Gunn are still optimistic about diversified programs that involve 
community members in planning for improved services, job training, 
economic development, and education (Jones 1987, Gunn 1993). The next 
step is to design enterprise zone evaluations with these questions in mind so 
that more firm conclusions can be drawn. 
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CHAPTERS 
ISSUES OF RACE AND MINORITY EQUITY IN 
STATE SPONSORED ENTERPRISE ZONE EVALUATIONS 
This chapter examines how existing evaluations of enterprise zones 
address the topic of minority welfare. As explained in Chapter 1, the 
evaluations reviewed here come from Colorado (1995), Florida (1993), New 
Jersey (Rubin and Armstrong 1989), Texas (Alwin 1994), and Wisconsin 
(1993). Each one is an official study conducted to inform state decision-
makers about the efficacy of their enterprise zone program. The chapter is 
divided into three sections focusing on the program goals articulated in the 
reports, evidence of targeting benefits toward people or places, and finally a 
look at the conclusions evaluators drew about program success. 
The goals, targeting mechanisms, and evaluation criteria of enterprise 
zone programs help explain why so few claims have been published about 
enterprise zone benefits for urban minorities. There is general inattention to 
racial inequity or its particular relationship to areas of concentrated urban 
poverty. Zone programs target poor persons by various means based on 
criteria such as residence in an area of concentrated poverty and individual 
economic disadvantage, but goals or evaluation criteria do not generally 
emphasize the same characteristics as the zone incentives. The agenda is 
divided between assisting disadvantaged people and improving the zone as a 
place. Zone evaluators do not fully appreciate the distinction between 
targeting benefits toward a specific population of people vs. a geographic area. 
Programs can be successful at one without succeeding at the other (e.g., 
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gentrification). The principal finding from this review of enterprise zone 
evaluations is the weak link between the structure of the programs, what they 
intend to accomplish, and what accomplishments they measure. The lack of 
intellectual clarity identified in Chapter 4, between the structure of zone 
programs and our understanding of concentrated poverty areas, is reflected in 
the mismatch observed in the state evaluation reports. 
Two operational definitions need to be clarified before jumping into 
the discussion in this chapter: benefiting or targeting people vs. places. I 
make the distinction based on the unit of analysis implied by the wording in 
the evaluation report. When a goal or incentive uses individuals as the unit 
of analysis then I identify it as targeting people, whereas if the geographic area 
of the zone was the unit of analysis, it targets a place. The distinction might 
not always be intentional on the part of the writer. For example, employing 
the unemployed is a goal targeting people. Decreasing the unemployment 
rate in the zone is a goal targeting a characteristic of a place. Creating jobs for 
zone residents targets people. Creating jobs in the zone targets a place. 
As an illustration of the distinction, creating jobs or reducing 
unemployment in a zone could be done without any positive economic 
impact on the zone residents: if new jobs go to outsiders, people commute 
into the zone from outside without employing more zone residents. The 
zone unemployment rate could decline as the result of increased 
employment of residents or because unemployed residents moved out or 
stopped actively seeking work. The differences can be important. 
The Relevance of Racial Inequity and Urban Poverty by State 
Racial inequity and urban poverty are not of equal importance in every 
state in terms of the number of persons below the poverty line or the 
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proportion concentrated in the inner city, but they are relevant to discussions 
on poverty in all five of the study states (Table 5-1). In all cases, race and 
Hispanic origin and location of residence are important predictors of poverty. 
All five states have large differences between the poverty rates for white, non 
Hispanics compared to the rest of the population (Figures 5-1 and 5-2). Also 
unsurprisingly, poverty rates in metropolitan areas are higher within the 
central city than elsewhere in the metropolitan area in all five states (figures 
not shown). Among the five states, roughly one quarter of all persons below 
the poverty line in 1989 are minorities living in the central city of a 
metropolitan area. 
Table 5-1. Poverty in Five States by Central City Residence and Minority 
Status 
Total Persons in Total Percent of All Persons Below the 
population poverty minority Poverty Line in 1989 
population Living in Minority Minority and 
Central City living in C. City 
Colorado 3,294,394 375,214 629,220 47% 40% 24% 
Florida 12,937,926 1,604,186 3,449,230 37% 51 % 24% 
New Jersey 7,730,188 573,152 1,995,622 43% 58% 35% 
Texas 16,986,510 3,000,515 6,665,631 53% 68% 41 % 
Wisconsin 4,891,769 508,545 422,678 51% 29% 25% 
Note: Central Cities are as defined by the U.S. Census of Population. 
Minorities are defined as the entire population minus white, non-Hispanic 
persons. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1993. 
Figure 5-1. Poverty Rates in Five States 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1993. 
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Figure 5-2. Poverty Rates in Central Cities within Metropolitan Areas 
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Note: Central City classification equals persons living in the central city of a 
metropolitan area as defined by the U.S. Census of Population. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1993. 
The Goals of Enterprise Zone Programs 
Plans can have multiple layers of goals including goals explicitly 
articulated in the plan document and the often unwritten goals of the 
multiple actors. The stated goals of enterprise zones vary, but goals 
statements generally include economic growth in terms of investment and 
jobs, employing the unemployed, improving the welfare of zone residents, 
and physical rehabilitation of the area. Haar et al. (1982: 8) summarized the 
purpose of American enterprise zones: 
The goal of the American strain of urban enterprise zones is to 
bring about a change in the conditions of our devastated inner 
cities--to tum around their pattern of decay. To achieve such a 
reversal, the areas selected as enterprise zones would, ideally, be 
endowed with an image of economic buoyancy which, in turn, 
would help the zone attract business, employ the unemployed, 
and improve the lives of zone residents and the areas in which 
they live and work. 
The five programs examined in this study all touch on improving the 
economic conditions of a place while only two included improving the 
economic situation of people in their goal statement (fable 5-2). Texas 
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reserves the prerogative of goals setting to local government; reducing 
unemployment is the only state goal mentioned. Only the Florida Office of 
the Auditor General (1993) and the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau 
(1993) refer to the goal of assisting "disadvantaged" or unemployed workers. 
Florida Office of the Auditor General (1993) uses language like "community 
conservation" and makes it plain that the business development program 
exists to benefit the people living in poverty areas and the economically 
disadvantaged regardless of their home address. None of the five states 
include goals explicitly regarding benefits to minority populations. 
Enterprise zone program components and evaluations are not 
narrowly designed around program goals. For example, with the 
uncontrolled growth of Colorado enterprise zone, the program is not 
narrowly targeted toward the most economically distressed people or areas. It 
is more of an overall business tax relief program. Evaluation criteria also 
reveal new layers of goals, like improving the state economy and tax base 
which are the foci of the evaluation in New Jersey. This study does not 
critically analyze the forces shaping enterprise zones program formation, but 
the preceding examples illustrate how multiple, often unwritten, agendas 
contribute to program design, implementation, and evaluation. Of the five 
studies examined, only New Jersey evaluators felt that the program had 
achieved its goals, and this is the only evaluation that did not reference the 
original intent of the program or question who benefited from the zone 
program. The four studies that were less favorable highlight the original 
goals of the state enterprise zone program and the need to measure socio-
economic conditions of targeted areas or populations. 
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Targeting on Three Levels 
Enterprise zones target groups of people and geographic areas in three 
ways: zone selection criteria, qualifications for receiving incentives, and the 
nature of the incentives themselves. The first two are obvious targeting 
mechanisms, but the nature of the incentives influences who benefits in 
discernible ways. Among the five states, the most popular way to target 
people was to tie benefits like corporate income tax credits to hiring zone 
residents or previous recipients of public assistance. Incentives targeted 
toward places seek to create jobs, induce businesses to fix up property, and 
increase business investment within the zones by tying tax breaks to certain 
activities that take place within the zones. Only the New Jersey report (Rubin 
and Armstrong 1989) mentions minority status at all. The following state-by-
state analysis gives more detail about how each program is targeted on each of 
the three levels. 
Taken together, the targeting mechanisms demonstrate an intent to 
target economically disadvantaged people and places. The dual agenda of 
targeting people and targeting places, makes it hard to determine what 
outcome is desired and how it should be measured. Evaluators had difficulty 
measuring success with either approach because of the dearth of appropriate 
data and the use of inadequate evaluation methods. 
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Table 5-2. Linkages to Distress and Disadvantage 
i Stated Goals l CD I FL NJ ! TX l WI j 
l Benefiting Peop1e Based on I \ 1 
! • race l l * ! I 
1 •employment status/ AFDC/JTPA /GPA j ~ X '. l ~- i X l 
L~ .... ~~~-~~~~~---~! .. L~~-~-~-~-~~~-............................................................ ._. ........................ ~ ............. l ..... ?S .... .l ............. 1 ..... : ...... 1 ............. 1 
! Benefiting Places ~ j [ l l i 
j • increas.!.~~j~~-~L .. ~~ducing un_~-~J.?!.~~-~~! ____ ........ J... .. ?S ... ..l. X ! X .L~ ... L..?S....J 
L~----~~£~~Yi.~.K .. ~?..~~-~~!Y. ... ~.:.~~~~-~-~---~-~---~~---~E~~ ............................. \ ............. i ............. \ ............. L.: .... J ............. l
1 • curbing population loss in areas j X j [ ! * j ! 
l ... ~.. .. i..~~~-~-~-~-~s. ..... ?..~.~~~-~~~---~-~-~~~.!~.~~! .......... .,. ...... ~ .................................... l... ......... LJ~ .... L ..~ .. .J .... ~..... L.~ .. ...l 
l---~---~-~£~Y~~~ .. P.!1Y~ic~! .. 9~ .. ~-~~!Y. ... ~! .. ~.~--~re.~ ........................................... t .... ~ .... ! .... ~ .... t .... ~ .... ! ..... : ..... ! ....... ...  1! 
i . , i l l l l I 
! .. !.'!.!.S.~~!!!.8.l.'!.~~~-~E'!..~.~---··--· ........................... ._. ......................................................... L .......... L ....... J .......... + ........ J ........... J 
1 Targeted Toward Peop]e ; i i i l ! 
i : l l l i ! 
l • race ~ 1 1 X l i ! 
t·;-effi··-io····me.Tit··51-ahi·5l .. A'mc7fff>A: .. Tcrx ..... .., ....... -......... .,. ...... t ............ t .. x-·t---x ... t-x-1' .... x 1 1--;-1-0-c!;tilil··c;Tresi<lence ......................................................................................... 't ........... t ..... x .. t·--x----1·-·x-t-····-·-i 
j Targeted Toward Places ; l ; l I ! L~~~-~E: .. c:~~~-~.l~~~L.E~9.:~~!~J? ... ~~~-~.P10..Y..~~~! .... - ................ L.~ .... L.~ ... L .. ~ ... 1 .. ~ .. J~ j • improving communi!J services in an area ~ ; X [ X l X ! ! 
l ·-~~!.!?.~E.S. .. £.~~~~!~O~-~ss .. i~--~E~~~----------·-------............ L ... ?S... .. L ... _.L ___ L~J .. __ .J 
t • improving _eh}'.sical guali~ of an area . ! X l X i -~-L .. ?S...J~ 
~ ~ increasing business investment in an area X j X l X ! X j X l 
r ; 1 l 1 ii 
t_Eva.lu_ation Considers Particip_atio11 or Ben!!f!:.t to ! __ L-LJ~ 
l Ind1v1duals , [ [ j l ! 
L~ ... !.~.~-~.L .. ~-~-~!!!Y. ... ~.!.~~-~-----··· .................................. , .. ,.. ........ .,. ..................................... l. .......... J .... ,.,.., ... L .... ,,., .... 1 .... ,.. .....  J .......... .J ~.:erevious __ unemploi:ment I AFDC/JTPA /GPA ~ L ..~ .... L ........ J ! X J 
l • location of residence 1 X l X 1 l l ! ~ .... ............ .................... ...................... ..... ~,._._. ........................ ....... _... .... ................. .......... ........... _ .......................... _._._. ............... ,.,. .................................................. ...... .. ;, ..... _. .. ........ .(. ..... _. ....... _.; ... ...,. ... .................  t.........  _ .......,..4 ......................... ~ l Place ; 1 [ i l i ~ -- : j ' j j i ~~ ~ncreasi~g jobs I re~ucing ~ne~-~!______ ~ X [ X l-~-1-?S.....L~ 
i. • imP.E~.~~S.. .. ~.?E_lm~~}}'. se~~-~es 2~ ... ~!1 are~..... ... .. ,L .. _.J._ ........ L ..... J_ ........ J.. .. _J 
i • curbin o ulation loss in areas i X ! X 1 ! ! l 
L~ .. ~.Erovi~ysical q~~!~!X .. ~i..C:~ .. ~ea _ ........ --................ L ..... J_>s..l ........... L.~ ... L .... ... l • increasing business investment in an area j l X l X 1 X ! X 
* The program in Texas is a state authorized and supported local initiative, 
with goal setting left to the local government unit. Reducing unemployment 
is the basic goal of the state program. 
GP A = General Public Assistance. 
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Zone Selection Criteria 
There is conflict in zone selection criteria between giving zone 
designation to the most distressed areas and giving the incentives to less poor 
areas that show greater development potential. Criteria in all five states seek 
to leverage tax breaks and investment in zones though a competitive zone 
selection process. The zone selection criteria and observations about their 
application in each state tell a very interesting story about how variable zone 
selection is between states. 
Colorado's selection criteria do not ensure that the areas selected will be 
extreme poverty areas. Unemployment at least 125% the state average, slow 
population growth, and per capita income less than 75% the state average are 
the "economic distress" criteria. Zone applications are also judged based on 
local plans and economic development initiatives by government and the 
private sector. The distress criteria apply to the overall zone although zones 
are drawn as oddly shaped, non-contiguous areas that do not even roughly 
correspond to census geography. Evaluators could not obtain accurate figures 
on the distress of zones. The law authorizes up to 16 zones, but 83 
amendments expanding zones have been approved since 1987, mostly in 
response to private business or local government requests for inclusion. In 
1990, 24 sites were added that had no resident population. Evaluators felt 
practice entirely circumvents the distress criteria because the addition of an 
unpopulated, undeveloped site cannot change the overall unemployment or 
poverty characteristics of the zone even if it is located in a very prosperous 
area. 
The Florida Enterprise Zone has the most well articulated selection 
process. Areas are scored on a checklist of items with 65% of the application 
score based on distress criteria including housing, income, employment, and 
50 
property value characteristics. Local participation factors are the remaining 
35% of the score. They include local tax incentives, commitments for 
redevelopment investment, targeting grant money to the zone, and 
commitment to additional local government services. Florida stratifies the 
competition by city size category to allow some of the zones to be in smaller 
cities. These zone criteria seem to emphasize valid measures of distress like 
the percent of population living below the poverty level while 
simultaneously using competition for zone designation as a way to leverage 
local planning and commitments. 
Texas' criteria focus on identifying contiguous areas that are both poor 
and deteriorating. Areas must be at least a square mile in area with over 
150% of the state unemployment rate sustained over a 12 month period or 
have a 9% population loss over 6 years. If that test is met, areas must meet 
one of several distress scenarios: poverty, UDAG eligibility, chronic 
abandonment, tax arrearages, substantial loss of business or be declared part of 
a state or federal disaster area. City or county government may designate up 
to three zones as long as they meet minimum standards. The real 
competition in Texas is for Enterprise Project designation. Similar to Florida, 
Texas divides the scoring process for Enterprise Projects between distress 
criteria and local effort using a 60-40 formula. 
New Jersey's selection criteria focus on potential for success and local 
commitment, with relatively weak criteria dealing with economic distress. 
There is a long list of preference policies for zone selection, including "the 
degree of commitment by public and private entities to utilize minority 
contractors and assure equal opportunities for employment in construction or 
reconstruction in the area" (Rubin and Armstrong 1989: 16) This is the only 
reference to benefiting minorities in any of the selection criteria. 
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Wisconsin selects zones based on the quality of the local development 
plan and the zone meeting two out of six economic distress criteria. These 
criteria include high unemployment, AFDC dependence, decline in assessed 
property values, low income, UDAG eligibility, and at least 5% of the work 
force in the jurisdiction being permanently laid-off in the preceding 18 
months. These criteria would allow long-term poverty areas to be designated 
as zones but also would allow working class areas that have experienced 
recent economic downturns to qualify. 
Requirements to Receive Incentives 
Unsurprisingly, many surveys indicate businesses prefer zone 
incentives with the fewest strings attached. Many states have strict 
requirements for businesses certification to receive tax credits in conjunction 
with the program. Administrators have found a trade-off between 
administrative simplicity and sending the desired economic message to firms 
through specific requirements. Where requirements are weak, like giving job 
credits for all new hires in the zone, documentation of who receives jobs, 
employment duration, and wages is generally lacking. 
Conditions imposed to qualify for incentives in different states vary 
widely, falling evenly between incentives tied to benefiting people and those 
targeted toward places. The following state by state overview focuses only on 
conditions imposed to qualify for specific benefits, not on the benefits 
themselves. Table 5-3 summarizes the requirements tied to incentives. The 
states intend these conditions to target benefits and motivate specific actions. 
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Table 5-3. Requirement to Receive Incentives 
I : co f FL I NJ 1 TX ~ WI I 
j Employing disadvantaged workers i ~ X ! X i X i X [ 1°.E.mpfoy1ng ... ione .. res"I«fei\ts··· ··· ..... .. ... .. ................................................. T .............. f ····'5c·T ... '5(····r·· .. ·x-···r·· .. ·········1 
i Hiring employees at low wages j i ! X j ! l [BT~~i=ii~-~-~-§£E~i.~~~~-~~~~~~~~!~~~~:~r~~~I~---~=====~r=:~==c::::~~:~=t==::~1=:~:.~:.:~1=:=:~:~J l Provi~i~g ~ealth insurance to new hires ~ X ! I i ! ! 
j Rehab1htation of zone property j X ; X , X : j ! 
: ..................................................... .. ....... .. .. .. ... ...................... .................. .... .............................. , ... ............. >·· ······ ···· ·· ·t ...................................... .... ... .. . 
i New construction in zone ! l I X j j 1 
'·------------------------·-----------------------···-···----------------------.------·-··--4------·-··--:-··--····:·····-··--: j Purchase business equipment for use in zone i X 1 X ! X ! i X 1 
! New business in the zone ! X ; , , , t"r>ieJ>.ar.a"tl"on .. orne·w-·hiisffi·e·;;5··5he .. wlihin .. io.ile···············r···············r·············· ··············-r·········· ··r··-:;c···i 
f'Xdcfing-valuetoagrf cuffuraT .. prod.ucts·--···--------------····-1-···:x----r------- ----··--·---r--··········r---1 
•.•.•• •.u.-...-.o.o.o.o,o,-.o . ....._o• • -.-.., ........ ,., .• _..._..,_. .• ,, ,, .• • •• """""~" ~-.~•o.o.••o.•~··••• •.-••••••.-••••••••••-.•••,••••••-...• ....... .-.... -.-..,. . .....-0.• .....-.o •••••-••••••••.,. •••••V•••-...• • ••..,,._...o.-•,_ .•. -. •. ••.-•.-•.o•.o.•$"°"'"°"'""""" •••.••,....-.• _._.. • ..._ ••.•. • .• .••• ••••.-.-."• ••• •••••~ 
i Performing research and development in zone ! X 1 ! j l X ~ !""conirihii'tI"On .. to ... ione .. JJr.og.ram .. o.r ... iJio}ecT ........................ .. r .. )c·r .. x· ..T· ..x· .. ·r············r· .. ··· .. .. ... l
Wisconsin gives tax incentives to zone businesses that hire individuals 
from any one of 11 categories of populations including AFDC recipients, 
dislocated workers, economically disadvantaged youth, and General 
Assistance recipients. Businesses preparing new sites in the zone, businesses 
expanding or purchases new equipment for use in the zone and businesses 
doing research in the zone qualify for specific credits. 
Texas grants incentives to businesses located in zones, and extra 
assistance if 25 percent of new hires are zone residents or economically 
disadvantaged.1 Competitive selection as a designated Enterprise Project 
provides the highest level of tax relief. 
In Colorado all the targeted zone incentives are tied to improving the 
zone, none are targeted toward disadvantaged people or zone residents. 
Incentives flow to new businesses or businesses hiring new employees, 
investing in equipment, adding value to agricultural commodities, insuring 
new employees through a qualifying health insurance company, performing 
lThe term "economically disadvantaged" is given no operational definition in the statute, nor 
by the report of the Auditor General. 
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research and development in the zone, rehabilitating a vacant commercial 
building, or making financial contributions to zone programs. 
Florida is unique in that it allows businesses located anywhere in the 
state to qualify for some tax exemptions if they hire residents of enterprise 
zones, previous AFDC recipients, or JTP A participants. Incentives are also 
available to any Florida business contributing revenues to approved 
development projects within zones. Incentives for purchasing or 
rehabilitating business property are only available to businesses located in a 
zone. 
New Jersey gives incentives to firms hiring employees if at least 25% of 
new hires fall in at least one of four categories: 1) resident of a NJ zone, 2) 
unemployed for at least a year prior to being hired and residing in NJ, 3) 
recipient of NJ Public Assistance programs for at least a year, or 4) any person 
determined to be economically disadvantage pursuant to JPT A. Additional 
tax breaks are available to qualified firms for purchase of equipment, services, 
construction materials, or for investments that contribute to the economic 
attractiveness of the zone. The one peculiar requirement tied to a financial 
incentive is the unemployment insurance rebate for hiring new employees 
with gross salaries less than $4,500 per quarter. 
While race has no bearing on qualifying for any of the incentives, the 
definitions of "targeted populations" used in Florida, New Jersey, Texas, and 
Wisconsin can do exactly that in a non-discriminatory manner. The only way 
to judge whether these definitions target minorities would be to document 
the percentage of minorities that fall within the targeted groups and the 
percentage of minorities receiving jobs tied to zone incentives. 
The requirements in Colorado are the least likely to provide benefits to 
minorities. The tax credits for new hires make no restrictions on whom the 
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firm hires. Colorado qualifications place a high emphasis on fixing up 
physical property, but even those improvements may not benefit poor 
neighborhoods if they are not located within areas of concentrated poverty. 
Alternatively, physical rehabilitation without programs to benefit residents 
can lead to gentrification and displacement. By going beyond zone 
boundaries, the Florida and New Jersey incentives are the most focused on 
employment and income growth for low income individuals. 
Nature of Incentives 
Each of the five evaluation reports listed available incentives. These 
lists tend to emphasize tax credits and may not be a comprehensive list of aid 
available from the local zone administration agency (fable 5-4). Job training 
and financial programs that are generally available to businesses in the state 
would not be listed as incentives. Of the five states, only the Texas evaluation 
mentions business assistance and financial programs as integral parts of the 
overall zone program. 
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Table 5-4. Type of Incentives 
j CTax Relief d. :,·. X i.l X !, X ! orporate tax ere it ; 
1 ..!.~~-~-~~~.~.! .. !~ .~ ... ~~-~~.~.! ................................................... ........... -... ··-·~--·-v----~-·--·v·--· · ··· · --·_j._ ... ~ ....... s .............. .i. ..... ~--· · · ·' 
i Sales and Use Tax reduction ! X ! X : X i i X l 
--·-- ·------···------·----........................................................................................................................ ,, ........ - .. 4----··-····-·--···••-' 
i Unemployment insurance rebate ! ! ! X i ! ~ 
~ Utility tax I electricity sales tax i i X 1 i : ~ 
[~0c:~LiJr~p~~:~::!~~::i.~~:~~~~~?.:~:::: : ~:::::~:::::::::::::::~::::~::::::~=:=:=::r::~:~~:1~::=::::~::1::~:~::::::F::::::::::1~:::::::::::1 
i Other Preferences and Assistance i l l ! f 
j Assistance obtaining reg. approval and licenses j ; ! X 1 
! Assistance with site location . s , 
~l'-~--l'l' .. l' ...... _,... .. ..__. ............ l' _______ .. _ .......... I'~ .................. ~ .............. ,... .... _ .. _ _. .................... ,.,.....,. ...... ,.,.,.,. .. ,. ....... -':.. • ....... ~~~....... ,..._ .. - .. ,,,,.I' .... ,.,.;.;~, 
1 Job training i i i ! ~ ! 
r·Financial programs·--··---·--··-······-··----··------·-·-·--··1---··-·r-----··-··-r--···-----·-r---·5c-··r----·----·-·1 
i Preference in grants and loans : ! l l X ! [ 
r·rre"fe.renc·e···for:·"J»ti'bHc··a·ei;·c;;;Ifidn .. fi11a:naar···················-r····· .. ·····r···········r .. ······· ·· ··1····"ic··r·············1 
i ..~~~-!-~.!.~.!-~.~~~-J~~--~-~E ... K ..~~!~~---~-~~:.~ ............................................ L ............ L ___ ... L .. ........ 1 ........ ~ .. L ............. i 
i General business assistance ! ! \ l X ! 1 
The mix of incentives offered in enterprise zones shape the outcome of 
the program, but in ways that are only tentatively understood (Wilder and 
Rubin 1996) One of the unique aspects of the evaluation design used in N ew 
Jersey is the business survey gathered data on the use of incentives by type of 
business. Based on the survey, three out of every four enterprise zone firms 
employ fewer than 50 people. Firms with over 500 employees represent 2.6% 
of all zone firms. Seventy percent of all businesses in the study were in 
business within a zone prior to 1980. Twenty-six percent started up since the 
program was initiated in 1985 and only four percent relocated into the zone. 
Small firms find the least benefit in enterprise zone incentives. Rubin 
and Armstrong (1989) found a strong negative correlation between firm size 
and the likelihood that the survey respondent reported the enterprise zone 
tax benefits had no impact on "their decisions to locate in, or expand 
operations in, the enterprise zone." Firms moving into the zone from out of 
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state are more likely to report that zone benefits have an impact on their 
location decision. The small, marginal firms that enterprise zones were 
originally designed to assist, make up the majority of businesses within the 
zones, but program incentives apparently provide more important benefits to 
larger firms. 
Table 5-5. Impact of Tax Breaks on Firm Decisions by Number of Employees 
in New Jersey 
Size of Firm 
Fewer than 10 employees 
10-19 employees 
20-49 
50-99 
100-499 
500+ 
Percent Reporting No Impact 
47% 
20% 
22% 
4% 
6% 
0% 
Source: Rubin and Armstrong (1989): 26 
In the survey firms were asked to rate the importance of zone benefits 
from 1, for the most important, to 6. Firm in all size classes rated exemption 
from sales tax on personal property and on materials as the most important 
zone benefits. The popularity of sales taxes stems not from their monetary 
value, but from their universal availability. Sales tax benefits are available to 
all kinds of firms within the zone and are not tied to hiring requirements. 
Retail establishments, which account for 25% of all zone businesses in New 
Jersey, are not eligible for corporate tax credits even if they hire targeted 
workers. 
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Table 5-6. Importance Ratings of Enterprise Zone Tax Benefits in New Jersey 
Zone Tax Benefit Mean Rating (l=most important) 
Sales Tax Exemption on 
-personal property 1.89 
-materials 2.17 
-services 2.59 
Corporation Tax Credit 
-$1,500 3.59 
-$500 4.01 
Unemployment Insurance Tax Rebate 4.44 
Source: Rubin and Armstrong 1989: 29 
Corporate Business Tax and Unemployment Insurance tax 
benefits require firms to meet specific hiring criteria and I or 
require extensive record keeping. Many firms noted in their 
responses that they cannot hire the type of employees required 
for Urban Enterprise Zone tax credit eligibility and still conduct a 
profitable business. In fact, many respondent firms suggested 
that a better trained labor force would improve business 
conditions in the UEZs. Other firms have stated that the paper-
work associated with the benefits is too time consuming relative 
to the value of the benefit offered. 
When asked to specify why they do not use the UEZ benefits, the 
. . primary reasons given were: 
- Employees not qualified 41% 
- Unaware of benefits 13% 
- Bureaucratic requirements 8% 
- Not a corporation 6% 
(Rubin and Armstrong 1989: 29-30) 
This evidence from New Jersey's experience leads to a few general 
observations. Ironically while, New Jersey got the most marks for targeting 
incentives through requirements in Table 5-2, the evaluation suggests that on 
net, the incentives offered are not targeted in a way to maximize 
opportunities for minorities or to maximize job growth. The connection 
between zone incentives and hiring "disadvantaged" zone workers is 
tenuous. Existing urban education and job training is inadequate to bridge 
the gap between employer expectations and the apparent skills of 
disadvantaged applicants. From a minority equity standpoint, the most 
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important incentives are those that help minority-owned businesses or create 
better jobs for minority workers. Minority workers may benefit from 
enterprise zones indirectly through the improved vitality of zone businesses, 
but many firms do not hire "qualified" zone workers for new jobs. The kind 
of enterprise zone incentives most typically offered do not assist start-up 
firms as much as larger establishments. Incentives like sales tax relief are 
geographically targeted through zone selection but are otherwise not 
strategically aimed at aiding specific workers or firms with high potential for 
creating jobs. 
Summary of Conclusions Made by Evaluators 
Two evaluations, Colorado, and Florida found a mismatch between 
goals and programs as implemented. Colorado identified problems with 
selection of territory for inclusion in zones. Florida found the mismatch 
between incentives offered and the needs of zone firms. The lack of critical 
data was a significant barrier to drawing conclusions about zone success. The 
conclusions evaluators were able to make with available data limited the 
discussion to things that were easiest to measure. Only New Jersey surveyed 
firms to collect data beyond administratively collected data, government 
statistics, and observations by zone administrators. 
The five studies did draw some conclusions with relevance to helping 
the poor. Colorado looked at evidence for job creation, information about 
whether jobs were filled by zone residents or resulted in an increase in per 
capita income, and changes in the statutory distress indicators: per capita 
income, unemployment, population change. Colorado could find no 
evidence of progress in these areas. The major contribution of the 
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evaluation, in this regard, was suggestions of how to improve the program so 
impacts can be assessed. 
Table 5-7. Conclusions Made by the Five State Evaluations 
Colorado 
Florida 
Texas 
New Jersey 
Wisconsin 
Implementation Process Program Impact 
The manner in which the program has been 
implemented is inconsistent with statutory 
goals. The huge extent of current zones, the 
amendment of boundaries to include new areas 
that do not meet selection criteria, and the 
disproportionate use of investment tax credits 
are the primary evidence for this conclusion. 
Low participation by businesses reveals a 
poor fit between goals and some of the 
incentives. The program does not address some 
of the more critical needs of small businesses. 
Business participation is less than expected. 
Factors contributing to the low-level of 
business participation include "limited 
business awareness of the program, limited 
availability of suitable development sites, and 
the reluctance of some private corporations 
disclose business plans as part of the 
certification process" (Wisconsin 1993: 5). 
Without a verification procedure for claimed 
tax credits there is no way to assure that 
businesses complied with their initial plans. 
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Existing reporting mechanisms are inadequate 
to assess program impact. The irregular and 
discontinuous boundaries of the zones make 
it impossible to use census data to evaluate 
change in socio-economic indicators. 
No definitive judgment of program success. 
Areas continue to be econorrucally distressed. 
Some zones have shown limited improvement, 
and most have not deteriorated substantially. 
Program had negligible impact on the hiring of 
AFDC recipients or JTP A participants. The 
program may have had an rm pact on the hiring 
of zone residents, but credits were claimed for 
less than 2% of the eligible work force. 
The program's overalJ impact on 
unemployment and other socioeconomic 
conditions have been minimal. The Annual 
Report overstates the benefits of the program. 
Companies locating in enterprise zones are 
not necessarily newly created or relocating 
from outside Texas. The program is not 
having a large impact on the most distressed 
areas m the state. 
The program's impact on the tax base of zones 
has l:leen minimal. 
The enterprise zone program had substantial 
positive impact on New jersey's economy. 
The benefits outweigh the costs. 
No impact. It is unlikely that the program is 
meeting its statutory gOals at the existing low 
levels of participation. 
It is too early to assess the long-term 
effectiveness of improving the economic health 
of the zones. 
The Florida Office of the Auditor General (1993) concluded that the 
program had a negligible impact on hiring AFDC recipients or JTP A 
participants and a modest impact on hiring zone residents. Overall 
socioeconomic conditions in the zone did not improve. The occupational 
mix of zone residents stayed the same. No zones showed major 
improvement in their economic environment in terms of median income, 
incidence of poverty, and unemployment. Measurements by the Wisconsin 
Legislative Audit Bureau (1993) included the number of certified individuals 
receiving jobs (1,018), the wages paid to those individuals, and some 
observations about the duration of employment. 
The Texas State Auditor (Alwin 1994) looked to see if the zones were 
targeted toward the poorest areas and found they were not. The report 
concluded that the Texas program did not target areas with the highest 
unemployment as evidenced by the fact that jobs were certified in only 2 of 
the 10 counties with the highest levels of unemployment. Certified actual job 
creation by designated projects occurred in 21 counties. ln 7 of those counties, 
the number of jobs created amounts to less than 0.1 percent of the labor force. 
Four of the studies engaged the issue of whether their state zones were 
effectively targeted toward the most distressed places of disadvantaged people, 
and none of the four had a positive finding. The one evaluation finding an 
overall positive impact left the issue of targeting benefits out of the picture 
entirely. These reports leave several important issues completely off the 
table: income inequality, workforce skills, and the wealth or minority status 
of business owners. Most reports did not even inquire about firm size or the 
importance of start-up businesses or businesses new to the enterprise zone. 
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Lessons from the Five State Evaluations 
The five state enterprise zone evaluations reviewed in this study 
provide little direct evidence that enterprise zones are successful in 
employing disadvantaged persons and no evidence that they alleviate 
existing racial inequity. Doubts about the wisdom of enterprise zones as 
enacted arise from the first level of evaluation, the logical link between the 
goals and the tools of intervention. Much of this weakness stems from lack 
of clarity about the goals of the program. There is a real mix between an 
emphasis toward benefiting people and improving places. This study focuses 
on a very narrow goal of enterprise zones, which has not been the primary 
concern of other evaluators and authors. But, even when we go beyond the 
goal of addressing minority inequity, existing evaluations come up short in 
demonstrating benefits on a variety of levels. In the end, we have weak and 
non-comprehensive evidence that any of the goals have been achieved. New 
Jersey is the only one of the five studies in where evaluators felt satisfied that 
they had found a positive impact of the program, and that was the only study 
in which evaluators did not even raise questions about how well benefits 
were targeted or who benefited. They even assumed values for key 
indicators, like wages, that they should have measured. 
Evaluations need to be clear about whether enterprise zones are a 
general economic stimulus package aimed at aggregate net growth in the state 
economy or whether they are aimed at improving the conditions in the 
poorest areas or the poorest people. A program can be successful at the 
distributional goal of improving the economic situation of the zones without 
creating any net income growth in the state and vice versa. Estimates of 
overall economic impact may help policy makers evaluate the returns on 
public investment in the broadest sense, but they do not provide any 
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information about whether the program is meeting the socioeconomic equity 
objective. 
Elaborate attempts to estimate economic impacts fall apart if they are 
not based on real measures of program activity, and they become less 
meaningful if they do not address program goals. The barriers to evaluation 
include access to consistent data on the subjects of interest, uncertainty, and 
the presence of confounding factors. This survey of enterprise zones 
evaluations suggests several lessons for future evaluations. 
The most common conclusion by evaluators is that they had 
insufficient evidence to draw sound conclusions. The disappointing 
evidence of program benefits does not prove that zones are an entirely 
ineffective urban policy tool, but it does highlights some of the weaknesses in 
program data collection and evaluation design. A good evaluation design 
must spell out the expected outcomes of the program and assemble evidence 
to determine whether or not the program resulted in the desired outcome. 
The data problems faced by state program evaluators highlight the 
importance of designing programs to allow evaluation. Documenting use of 
zone incentives and associated investments needs to be part of program 
administration. In addition, zones should be contiguous and correspond to 
census geography enough that available distress statistics will allow 
evaluators to measure change. 
In the case of enterprise zones, we are trying to evaluate change in the 
zone over time as a result of the program. Time series studies need 
measurements at multiple points in time to show the overall trend before 
and after the program began. With time series studies there is a very real 
possibility that something other than the program may be causing observed 
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changes. A convincing evaluation design would measure change over time 
that is different from change in comparable areas. 
A quasi-experimental design, must substitute for a controlled 
experiment because zones are not selected randomly. We can select 
comparison areas that share many characteristics with the zone to provide 
supporting evidence as to whether the trends observed in the zone are a 
result of the zone program or external circumstances. The multiple time 
series design combining time series measurements and comparison groups is 
ideal for enterprise zones because it provides some measure of control for 
likely economic trends in absence of the program. 
Overall, the plethora of targeting mechanisms demonstrates an intent 
to target zones to economically disadvantaged populations and locations. 
When state evaluators asked whether the program produced positive 
economic benefits and for whom, they generally were unable to produce 
positive evidence. Despite the rhetoric about enterprise zones, there is a lack 
of thorough evaluation research and no compelling theoretical argument to 
suggest that enterprise zones will accomplish equity goals. The divided focus 
between targeting places and targeting people, makes less clear what outcome 
is desired and how it should be measured. There is a poor fit between 
enterprise zone programs and the goal of improving the economic status of 
disadvantaged minorities. 
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CHAPTER6 
CONCLUSION 
Enterprise zones, in general, are the wrong tool to fight poverty in 
blighted urban neighborhoods. There is a poor fit between the structure of 
enterprise zones and the goal of providing opportunities for economic 
advancement to the urban poor. Nevertheless, no well-designed evaluation 
research has been conducted to allow conclusions of much certainty on either 
side of the issue. We are left with doubt about whether enterprise zones 
improve the economic conditions in zones, little reason to believe they help 
put the urban poor on the track of economic advancement, and no reason to 
believe that zones are a step toward reducing racial inequality. 
Recommendations for Future Evaluations 
The evidence from evaluation studies reviewed in this report is patchy 
and plagued with methodological problems. From the standpoint of this 
study, existing evaluation research has not addressed all the essential 
questions to understand who benefits from zones, but more glaringly, most 
evaluations do not measure program impact. Enterprise zones do not, by 
their nature, defy evaluation. Based on the strengths and oversights of earlier 
studies I recommend future evaluations use a multiple time series 
comparison evaluation design. 
A multiple time series design measuring changes in particular 
indicators over time in the zones and comparison areas is the most 
promising quasi-experimental design to distinguish between program 
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impacts and coincidental changes. When practical, measurement should be 
made at multiple points in time to distinguish real trends from random or 
cyclical fluctuation. Comparison areas are useful in program design to 
distinguish the regional economic conditions facing the zone from the impact 
of the zone program. 
While no study will be able to encompass all important questions, 
examination of minority participation in zone programs as new employees or 
as entrepreneurs would add greatly to the understanding of the impact of 
enterprise zones. We need more information about new jobs, including 
wages, duration of employees in jobs, and whether the job offers 
opportunities for advancement. Studies should also measure whether job 
training is adequate to allow firms to hire disadvantaged workers. Collecting 
data on these indicators would require use of administratively collected data, 
surveys, and key informant interviews. The evaluation of comprehensive 
economic development programs will always be problematic, but these 
suggestions will help provide a clearer picture of program achievement, 
particularly with regard to equity objectives. 
Concluding Discussion 
The policy debates on enterprise zones tend to underestimate and 
obscure the costs of overcoming economic disadvantage. There are a lot of 
political questions to be asked about enterprise zones, like who should benefit 
from enterprise zones to justify the unequal tax treatment, and how 
aggressively should benefits be targeted toward meeting the goal of minority 
equity. This paper is premised on the claim that inequity along lines of race 
or minority status is detrimental to the well-being and stability of the nation 
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and that as a primary component of contemporary urban policy, enterprise 
zones should seek to address existing disparities. 
There is little reason to believe that enterprise zones programs that 
simply emphasize investment and job creation will have any significant 
impact on the concentration of poverty in central cities or on the long-term 
economic status of minority populations. This study has found a lack of 
attention to the question of who benefits. Many authors have posed this 
question in a variety of ways, but the existing evaluation research holds only 
generally negative, albeit inconclusive, evidence that enterprise zones benefit 
urban minorities or the urban poor. This picture pieced together from 
diverse sources is one of doubt about the potential effectiveness of state 
enterprise zone programs. As tax incentive programs, enterprise zones are 
not designed to combat the many facets of urban poverty including inequality, 
segregation, and discrimination. Enterprise zones are a tool for increasing 
local economic prosperity in a targeted area without a clear connection to any 
economic model of urban poverty areas. The existence of profound 
inequality speaks to the fact that even if enterprise zones were successful at 
increasing investment and jobs in targeted areas, they would not necessarily 
benefit people of all backgrounds or races equally. This could manifest itself 
as the difference between improving the long-term earning potential of 
disadvantaged workers and gentrifying a particular neighborhood. 
According to the economic literature, ghetto development is a 
multifaceted artifact of the economy. The literature reviewed in Chapters 
Three and Four suggests that reversing economic decline in areas of 
concentrated poverty will require intervention on many fronts including 
investment in public services, education, and job networks. 
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In conclusion, enterprise zones are not the correct tool to work toward 
a solution to America's urban crisis. They have equivocal effects on the poor 
and disadvantaged. They focus narrowly on jobs when geographical location 
of jobs is not the only issue. The lack of conclusive evidence about benefits in 
and of itself is not a compelling reason to abandon the urban enterprise zone 
approach. But when we put all the fragments together, the story that emerges 
is that enterprise zones, in their common form, are the wrong tool for 
fighting concentrated urban poverty. The type of interventions incorporated 
in state enterprise zone programs do not effectively intervene in the processes 
of ghetto formation as we currently understand them. Targeting a small area 
for revitalization is a valid way to maximize visible impact, but we need a 
more comprehensive set of tools to deal with the larger issues of concentrated 
urban poverty. 
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